Opposition Effect


The Sun is by far the largest object in the solar system.
It contains more than 99.8% of the total mass of the Solar System
(Jupiter contains most of the rest).


Is it a coincidence that all the planets in our galaxy fit exactly in the distance between the Earth and the Moon.


Is it a coincidence that while the Moon travels once around the Earth, it rotates exactly once.


Is it a coincidence that half of the Earth is covered in water. 


The Moon is far too big to be a “true” moon. It should not be larger than 40 miles or so, but it is over 2,000 miles in diameter. It is the size of the US, and not the size of Maui.

The Moon doesn’t actually orbit Earth at all. Instead, the Earth and the Moon orbit each other, around a point between them.

The oldest age for the Earth is estimated to be 4.6 billion years old, moon rooks were dated at 5.3 billion years old, and the dust upon which they were resting was at least another billion years old. The Moon is older than the Earth.

The Moon is a given satellite.

Moon rocks are magnetized, this is odd, because there is no magnetic field on the moon itself. Were they of alien origin? The abundance of refractory elements like titanium in the surface areas is so pronounced that several geologists proposed the refractory compounds were brought to the moon’s surface in great quantity in some unknown way.

Moon Mascons are large, dense, circular masses lying twenty to forty miles beneath the center of the moon’s maria; “are broad, disk-shaped objects that could be possibly some kind of artificial construction. For huge circular disks are not likely to be beneath huge maria, centered like bull’s-eyes in the middle of each. These things are ten times as strong as gravitational anomalies on Terra. They are called mass concentrations. 80% of the mascons are on the Moon facing us.

The maria is composed primarily illeminite, a mineral containing large amounts of titanium, the same metal used to fabricate the hulls of deep-diving submarines and the skin of the SR-71 “Blackbird”. Uranium 236 and neptunium 237 (elements not found in nature on Earth) were discovered in lunar rocks, as were rustproof iron particles.

The moon’s mean density is 3.34 gm/cm3 (3.34 times an equal volume of water) whereas the Earth’s is 5.5. What does this mean? If the astronomical data are reduced, it is found that the data require that the interior of the moon is more like a hollow than a homogeneous sphere. On November 20, 1969, the Apollo 12 crew jettisoned the lunar module ascent stage causing it to crash onto the moon. The LM’s impact (about 40 miles from the Apollo 12 landing site) created an artificial moonquake with startling characteristics – the moon reverberated like a bell for more than an hour.

“Shallow” moonquakes can register up to 5.5 on the Richter scale—enough to move large furniture around—and last for a remarkably long 10 minutes. According to NASA, these quakes also have the effect of making the Moon “ring like a bell.”

The ashes of Eugene “Gene” Shoemaker remain on the Moon.

The Moon acts as a stabilizer, holding the Earth at the right angle to allow for climate seasons and keeping water liquid on most of our planet.

Some of the pictures taken by the various vessels that have visited it show some very strange things on the Moon’s surface. Many of these images seem to show artificial constructs that range from tiny canister-like shapes to the “Shard,” which appears to be a towering structure that could be at least 1.6 kilometers (1 mi) tall. There is even a large castle that is suspended high above the surface of the Moon. All of this seems to point toward an advanced civilization that has lived on the Moon and built complicated structures.

Moon dust smells like spent gunpowder.

The Fission Theory argues that the Moon used to be a part of our planet that was separated at some very early point of Earth’s history. This would make the Moon part to what is currently the Pacific Ocean basin.

The Capture Theory says that the Moon was just wandering the universe until our gravitational field caught it. Other theories say our satellite was either condensed from a bunch of asteroids or the remains of Earth’s collision with an unknown Mars-sized planet. Currently, the most likely candidate for the Moon’s origin story is the Ejected Ring Theory, which is better known as Giant Impact Theory. According to this version, a protoplanet (a planet that is forming) called Theia collided with Earth. The ensuing cloud of debris eventually condensed into the Moon.

According to a volunteer-based experiment by the University of Basel in Switzerland, the phases of the moon affect—and disturb—human sleep cycles in a clearly measurable way, and the absolute worst night’s sleep is usually had during the full moon.

The shadows of the Moon are far darker than those on Earth due to the lack of atmosphere. Everything the Sun doesn’t shine directly on is pitch black. Once a foot steps in a shadow, you can not see it anymore. The opposition effect, a phenomenon that makes certain dark, shadowed areas appear surrounded by a bright aureole when they’re viewed in a certain angle to the Sun. Moon shadows have halos.


It has been called the most improbable coincidence in what we think we know of what is in the universe. What are the odds that our Moon would be the exact size to save us from a solar flare.  The Sun’s distance from Earth is 400 times the Moon’s distance from Earth, and the Sun’s diameter is 400 times the Moon’s diameter. That makes me smile.

“There is no astronomical reason why the moon and the sun should fit so well. It is the sheerest of coincidences, and only the Earth among all the planets is blessed in this fashion.”


Is it a coincidence that one side of the Moon you never see. Why would the Moon only show one side to Earth? Unless something is hidden on this side.

Our moon is the only moon in the solar system that has a stationary, near-perfect circular orbit.

Stranger still, the moon’s center of mass is about 6000 feet closer to the Earth than its geometric center (which should cause wobbling), but the moon’s bulge is on the far side of the moon, away from the Earth. 

Maybe, the moon is a gigantic extraterrestrial craft, brought here eons ago by intelligent beings?

Moon is, apparently, a terraformed, engineered piece of hardware, with an outer layer of dust and rock, and beneath this 3-mile layer, a solid 20-mile thick shell made from highly resistant materials like Titanium. Uranium 236, Mica, Neptumium 237.

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I am writing a World Peace Plan

It is not enough to save Israel, I must save the world.

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Peace in the Coming World


Arunachal Pradesh

Gautama – new country

Tawang 2,085 km2 (805 sq mi)
West Kameng 7,422 km2 (2,866 sq mi)
East Kameng 4,134 km2 (1,596 sq mi)

China –
Lohit 2,402 km2 (927 sq mi)
Anjaw 6,190 km2 (2,390 sq mi)


Doklam covering 89 square kilometres (km2) is part of Bhutan
Sinchulumpa and Gieu covering about 180 kmis part of China.


Badme is a town in the Horn of Africa and the focus of a territorial dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It is claimed by both , which considers Badme to be a part of Gash-Barka Zone, and Ethiopia, which considers Badme part of the Semien Mi’irabawi Zone of the Tigray Region. This dispute was the basis of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, which began in 1998. Currently the town is occupied by Ethiopia, despite an international court ruling in 2002 that the town fell within Eritrean territory.


Banc du Geyser (also Banc du Geysir) is a mostly submerged reef in the Mozambique Channel‘s northeastern part, 125 km (78 mi) northeast from Mayotte, 112 km (70 mi) southwest of the Glorioso Islands, and 200 km (124 mi) off the northwestern coast of Madagascar. France and the Comoros claim the Banc du Geyser as part of their exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The reef is also claimed Madagascar. From the French point of view, it is part of the EEZ of Glorioso Islands, one of their Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean. Madagascar announced its annexation in 1976, presumably because of the possibility of oil fields in the vicinity but the Banc du Geyser is controlled in fact by the French forces armées de la zone sud de l’océan Indien. In 2012, France included the reef in the parc naturel marin des Glorieuses, a marine protected area, to preserve the endangered flora and fauna of Glorioso Islands.

Bure is a small disputed area on the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, about 50 miles west of Asseb. Eritrea considers Bure to be a part of its Southern Red Sea Zone, while Ethiopia considers Bure part of Administrative Zone 1 of its Afar Region. This area lies across the important Awash-Asseb highway, which in the past has been an important trucking route.

Heglig or Panthou as it is known to the Dinka (also spelled Heglieg or Pandthou) is a small town at the border between the South Kordofan state of Sudan and the Unity State in South Sudan. The entire Heglig or Panthou is recognized by South Sudanese government as a disputed area, but Sudan is considered it as its own. The Dinka tribe who claim Panthou or Heglig as their own hometown state that it was the original name that was translated from Dinka word of tree called Thou preceded by Pand for land or area into an Arabic word heglig, for the same kind of trees. The area was contested during the Sudanese Civil War. In mid-April 2012, the South Sudanese army captured the Heglig (Panthou) oil field from Sudan. Sudan claimed it took back the oil-rich region of Heglig after a 10-day occupation by South Sudan’s army (SPLA).

Jodha, South Sudan

Mariam-uz-Zamani Begum, a title bestowed to Heer Kunwari alias Hira Kunwari alias Harka Bai, was an Empress of the Mughal Empire. She was the first Chief Rajput wife of Emperor Akbar, and the mother of the next Mughal Emperor, Jahangir.

Kabale District is a district in Western Uganda. As with most other Ugandan districts, it is named after its ‘chief town’, Kabale. It was originally part of the district of Kabale Kigezi, before the districts of Rukungiri, Kanungu and Kisoro were peeled off to form separate districts.

Kafia Kingi (or Kafiya Kinji) is a community in Western Bahr el Ghazal state, South Sudan. The Kafia Kingi area is a mineral-rich region on the border between Sudan and South Sudan. It was due to be given to South Sudan under the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which required use of the Sudan “north-south line” as of “January 1, 1956.” .[1] Sudan controls all or most of this area today, though at times since independence South Sudan forces have briefly controlled large portions.[2] It was not until 1960 that the Kafia Kingi area was transferred north of that line and added to Darfur. Warlord Joseph Kony is thought to be hiding in Kafia Kingi. The Kafia Kingi region is known haven for ivory smugglers. Congolese Ivory is frequently held in Kafia Kingi before being taken north into Darfur.

Kaka, South Sudan

Kahemba is a territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is located in the Kwango District.

Moyo District is a district in Northern Uganda. Like many other Ugandan districts, it is named after its “chief town”, Moyo, where the district headquarters are located.



The Northern Borders Region (Arabic: منطقة الحدود الشماليةAl-Ḥudūd Aš-Šamāliyya) is the least populated region of Saudi Arabia. It is located in the north of the country, bordering Iraq and Jordan. It has an area of 111,797 km² and a population of 320,524 at the 2010 census (preliminary result). The region is sub-divided into three governorates: ‘Ar’ar, Rafha and Turayf. Its capital is ‘Ar’ar.

Al-Jawf Region (Arabic: الجوفal-Ǧawf pronounced [alˈdʒoːf]), also spelled Al-Jouf, is a region of Saudi Arabia, located in the north of the country, containing its only international border with Jordan to the west. It has an area of 100,212 km² and a population of 440,009 at the 2010 Census (preliminary result). Its capital is Sakakah.



Al Anbar (Arabic: الأنبار; al-’Anbār or Anbar) is a Western Region of Iraq. The largest province in Iraq by area, it shares borders with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Al Anbar is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim Arab. Its capital is Ar Ramadi. Before 1976 the province was known as Ramadi; before 1962, it was known as Dulaim. 138,501 km2 (53,476 sq mi).

Northeast border of the Euphrates River to Saddat Al-Hindiyah, then along Al-Karbala border to the Al-Anbar border.


Southern border of the Euphrates River south from Syria. Along the Euphrates to the Tharthar Canal, near Habbaniyah. North up the Tharthar Canal to Tharthar Lake. Out of Tharthar Lake, north on Thraa1 and Thraa2 to  34°12’1.01″N 43°51’11.72″E on the Tigris River, near Qulah. North up the Tigris River to Syria.



Al-Anbar border to the Al-Karbala border to the Euphrates River, near Saddat Al-Hindiyah. North up the Euphrates River to the Tharthar Canal, near Habbaniyah. North up the Tharthar Canal to Tharthar Lake. Out of Tharthar Lake, north on Thraa1 and Thraa2 to  34°12’1.01″N 43°51’11.72″E on the Tigris River, near Qulah.

North up the Tigris River to  35° 3’29.69″N 43°33’9.68″E

East along the northern border of the Saladin Governorate then along the northern border of Diyala Governorate to Iran.

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The Declaration to the Seven

The Declaration to the Seven was a document written by the British diplomat Sir Henry McMahon and released on June 16, 1918 in response to a memorandum issued anonymously by seven Syrian notables in Cairo who were members of the newly formed Party of Syrian Unity, established in the wake of the Balfour Declaration and the November 23, 1917 publication by the Bolsheviks of the secret May 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France. The memorandum requested a “guarantee of the ultimate independence of Arabia”. The Declaration stated the British policy that the future government of the regions of the Ottoman Empire occupied by Allies of World War I should be based on the consent of the governed.

The Declaration to the Seven is notable as the first British pronouncement to the Arabs advancing the principle of national self-determination. Although the British sought to secure their position by adopting the Wilsonian doctrine of Woodrow Wilson, neither Britain nor France was prepared to implement their promises to the Arabs nor to abdicate the position won by victory over the Ottoman Empire.

The document was not widely publicized, the Declaration may explain the action of General Edmund Allenby, who ordered a halt to the advance after the rout of Turkish forces outside Damascus and allowed the city to be captured by Arab forces in September 1918 after the Battle of Megiddo and acting on instructions from London, thus bolstering the Arab claim to the independence of Syria whilst simultaneously undermining the French claims to the territory under the terms of the Sykes–Picot Agreement.

The Seven

  • Rafiq al-Azm;
  • Sheikh Kamal al-Qassab;
  • Mukhtar al-Sulh;
  • Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar;
  • Khaled al-Hakim;
  • Fauzi al-Bakri;
  • Hasan Himadeh.
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US Congress Declaration


1. If the speaker of the House of Representatives calls upon a joint session of the United States Congress (the House of Representatives and Senate) and its members to make their declarations of allegiance and a member has not done so, that member shall not enjoy the rights of membership as long as he has not made the declaration.


Non-declaration due to dual-citizenship (Amendment)

If a United States Congress (the House of Representatives and Senate) member holds an additional, non-United States of America citizenship, and the laws of the country whose citizenship he holds permit him to be released from such citizenship, he shall not declare allegiance until after he has done everything required on his part to be released from such citizenship, and he shall not enjoy the rights of a United States Congress (the House of Representatives and Senate) member until he makes his declaration.

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Citizenship and Nationality in Israel/Palestine

Law of Return – The Law of Return of 1950, the Nationality Law of 1952, and the Entry into Israel Law of 1952 establish the right of all Jews and their family members worldwide to immigrate, or return, to Israel and to immediately become Israeli citizens.

A close reading of these laws reveals that the 1950 Law of Return treats every Jew worldwide as having “returned,” including those in Israel/Palestine who were born in Israel and never left.


Readings on Citizenship and Nationality in Israel/Palestine

Structures of Identity, Difference and Democracy

A Curriculum from the Open University Project at Columbia University

Exploring the Israeli concept of citizenship offers a particularly interesting way to understand the contours of belonging, dispossession, equality and discrimination in the context of Israel/Palestine.  This is especially true as the Israeli Knesset considers a “Nationality” bill that would significantly alter what it means to be an Israeli citizen.

This curriculum provides a set of readings, guided questions, and references for students interested in digging deeper into the political and human rights implications of i) the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, also referred to by Palestinians as the “catastrophe” or “nakba;” ii) Zionism (in its political, national, and racial conceptions); and iii) the competing claims to both dispossession and belonging that are at stake in Israel/Palestine.

The curriculum is divided into three sessions with readings and discussion questions for each session.

Reading Materials:


Session 1: Nationality vs. Citizenship in the Israeli/Palestinian Context

The state of Israel was founded in 1948 with a vision that it be “the sovereign state of the Jewish people,”[1] and “the creation of the entire Jewish people.”[2]  Unlike in the U.S.[3] and other contexts, Israeli law maintains a crucial distinction between the categories of nationality (le’om) and citizenship (ezrahut).

Key to the notions of belonging, returning, and remaining in the land that became the state of Israel in 1948 is the question of who is a Jew?  According to Jewish law, a child born to a Jewish mother or an adult who has converted to Judaism is considered a Jew; one does not have to reaffirm their Jewishness or practice any of the laws of the Torah to be Jewish. According to Reform Judaism, a person is a Jew if they were born to either a Jewish mother or a Jewish father.  Israeli law states that only persons born to a Jewish mother or who have converted to Judaism are considered Jewish for the purposes of Jewish/Israeli citizenship, an identity particularly relevant to the the Law of Return, discussed below.

The Balfour Declaration of 1917, issued by the British Foreign Secretary at the end of World War I, expressed the British government’s support for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”  Similarly, the Zionist Organization prepared a proposal for the Paris Peace Conference in 1919,[4] in which it suggested that the key actors shaping the post-World War I world order “recognize the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home.”  The early reference to settlement in Palestine as part of the creation of a “national home” was widely understood as a stepping stone to the ultimate goal of creating of a Jewish state.

Thus, from early on Zionists understood Israel to be a “national home for the Jewish people” more than a new state in which Jews would form a majority of Israeli national citizens.[5]  Thus we see the tension inherent in the commitment to Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state.”[6]

Read: Ernst Frankenstein, “The Meaning of the Term ‘National Home for the Jewish People,’” Jewish Yearbook of International Law 27 (1948).  Focus on pp. 27-33 and 39-41.

The call for the creation of a new state – described variously as the ethnic, cultural, and/or religious home for the Jewish people – coming at the end of a war waged to defeat brutal forms of German ethno-nationalism struck some as a valid form of national self-determination in keeping with President Wilson’s Fourteen Points,[7] while others viewed it as contrary to a rising global commitment to democratic liberalism.  U.S. legal scholar Morris Cohen expressed some skepticism with respect to the wisdom of Jewish ethno-nationalism in The New Republic in 1919:

How could a Jewish Palestine allow complete religious freedom, freedom of inter-marriage and free non-Jewish immigration, without soon losing its very reason for existence?  A national Jewish Palestine must necessarily mean a state founded on a particular race, a tribal religion and a mystic belief in a particular soil, whereas liberal American stands for separation of church and state, the free mixing of races, and that men can change their habitation and language and still advance the process of civilization … Zionists are quite willing to ignore the rights of the vast majority of the non-Jewish population of Palestine … Whether tribalism triumphs or not, it is none the less evil, and thinking men should reject it as such.[8]

The implications of this distinction in the Israeli context between nationality (le’om) and citizenship (ezrahut) are multiple and significant:

  • The General Assembly of the United Nations, in Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947, divided the territory of Palestine as follows:
    • A Jewish State covering 56,47% of Mandatory Palestine (excluding Jerusalem) with a population of 498,000 Jews and 325,000 Arabs;
    • An Arab State covering 43.53% of Palestine, with 807,000 Arab inhabitants and 10,000 Jewish inhabitants;
    • An international trusteeship regime in Jerusalem, where the population was 100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs.

  • The state of Israel was created to protect the sovereignty of the “nation of Jews.”
  • UN Resolution 181 anticipated the creation of an Arab-Palestinian state that would protect the sovereignty of the “nation of Palestinians.”
  • At the end of the 1948 War, when the state of Israel was founded in a territory larger than that outlined by the UN’s Resolution 181, 150,000 Arab-Palestinians remained in Israel within the Green Line and became citizens of Israel.[9] Today Arab-Palestinians comprise a substantial minority (around 20%) of the citizens of Israel and consider themselves to have Palestinian nationality.
  • After 1948, the majority of Palestinian people, those who did not become citizens of Israel, settled in the other parts of Mandatory Palestine, including the West Bank, which became part of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, which came under Egypt’s control.  Others fled or were expelled from the territory that became Israel and ended up in refugee camps in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon.  Thus, the founding of Israel rendered the Palestinians a stateless people who retained a sense of national identity, but were dispersed across a broad range of jurisdictions – mirroring in a tragic way the status of the Jewish people prior to the founding of the state of Israel.[10]
  • One must be, of course, Jewish to be part of the “nation of Jews,” while being Jewish is not a requirement of Israeli citizenship.[11]
  • The “nation of Jews” includes all Jews both living in Israel and in the larger diaspora.  Thus, the people who can make a claim to the identity of “Jewish national” extends well beyond the Jewish people residing in the territorial state of Israel.  In the words of the Israeli Supreme Court: “There is no Israeli nation separate from the Jewish People. The Jewish People is composed not only of those residing in Israel but also of Diaspora Jewry.”[12]
  • There is no such thing as “Israeli nationality.” In fact, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that recognizing “Israeli nationality” would create a schism between the Jewish people, making them choose between their Jewish identity and their Israeli identity.[13]  “[T]he principle of self-determination should, in its view, apply to peoples and not to ‘shreds of peoples’ …”[14]  The Israeli Supreme Court quoted a lower court’s reasoning: “One cannot belong to two nationalities. If an Israeli nationality is recognized, members of the Jewish nationality in Israel will have to choose between the two: Are they Israelis, in which case they would not be Jewish; or are they Jewish, in which case they would not be Israeli; the same would apply to members of minority groups [in Israel]. Recognition of such nationality may bring about the national and social disintegration of the entire nation … A separatist trend of splitting the Jewish nations must not be accepted.”[15]
  • Under the Israeli Population Registry Law, identity cards are issued to all Israeli citizens.  Until recently, Israeli-Jews were classified as Israeli citizens with “Jewish nationality,” Israeli-Arabs were classified as Israeli citizens with “Arab nationality,” and Israeli-Druze were classified as Israeli citizens with “Druze nationality.” One could not indicate “Israeli” as one’s nationality on one’s identity card.[16]
  • What does it meant that Israel is a “Jewish state”?  In an Israeli Supreme Court case from 2003 Chief Justice Aharon Barak explained that at the center of the Jewish characteristics

stands the right of every Jew to make aliya [to immigrate as a Jew] to the State of Israel, that in Israel Jews will be a majority, Hebrew will be the main official language of the state, and its main holidays and symbols reflect the national emergence of the Jewish people, the heritage of Israel is a central component of the state’s religious and cultural heritage.[17]

Questions for Session 1 on the distinction between “citizenship” and “nationality” in the Israeli context

  1. What does it mean that Israel is a “Jewish and democratic state”?  Is this merely a descriptive claim, meaning that the majority of its citizens are Jewish? Or does it imply something deeper insofar as Israel was founded as “the sovereign state of the Jewish people”?  Perhaps this deeper meaning implicates only the laws of return and citizenship, granting Jews special rights to citizenship that are denied to all others, including the indigenous Palestinian population. Or does the “Jewish nature” of the state include other forms of preferential treatment for Jews (such as land ownership[18], voting, and other social and political rights)?  In what way is the state of Israel a political tool that “belongs” to Jews both within Israel and in the larger global diaspora?[19]  “Israel is defined, internationally … and internally … as the Jewish people’s nation state.”[20]  Is there a point at which the uniquely Jewish character of the state of Israel undermines its identity as a democratic state?
  2. What are the implications of the state assigning every citizen an “ethno-religious” label or identity, whether or not they identify with it?  Would a similar system in the U.S. trouble you – whereby the government issued ID cards on which you were required to check a box indicating an ethno-religious nationality (African-American, Mexican-American, Jewish-American, Arab-American, Euro-American).  The census does something similar in the U.S. but official identification cards, such as a driver’s license or passport, do not.  Is Israel different, or sufficiently different from the U.S. context, to render such a designation legitimate?
  3. In what ways might principles of democracy be undermined by a legal system that includes/recognizes its minority civilly but not nationally?  That is, does the idea of democracy require a state to be committed to a unified or singular notion of nationality, or that it be at least neutral as to diverse nationalities within the state, and therefore must play no part in ratifying or reifying national differences?  If not, why not?
  4. In what ways might it matter that the minority Palestinians in Israel are not immigrants (as were most members of the majority at the founding) but are rather an indigenous population?[21]  Are there parallels to the treatment of Native Americans by European settlers in the U.S.?
  5. Does the “Jewish nature” of Israel raise problems apart from the fissures that have been created between Jewish and non-Jewish Israeli citizens?   Even within the Jewish community in Israel there are significant differences between religious and secular Jews, between orthodox and reformed Jews, and between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews.[22]  Might some Jewish Israeli citizens find it in their interests to better enfranchise non-Jewish citizens?
  6. Article 15 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights sets forth that:

– Everyone has the right to a nationality.
– No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Is there an argument that the Israeli Population Registry Law might violate this provision of the UN Declaration of Human Rights?

Read the excerpts from the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision in Uzzi Ornan et al. v. State of Israel.[23]

Do the opinions in the case inform or change your answers to the above questions?

National Belonging In the Palestinian Context:

In 1964 the Arab League initiated the creation of an organisation representing the Palestinian people and defending their interests, the Palestinian National Council (PNC), which then created the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO.  In the aftermath of the 1967 war with Israel, the PNC adopted the Palestinian National Charter (1968), a document that clearly articulated a Palestinian notion of sovereignty and national identity.  Relevant parts of the Charter include:

  • Article 1: Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.
  • Article 2: Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.
  • Article 3: The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.
  • Article 4: The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership in the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them.
  • Article 5: The Palestinians are the Arab citizens who were living permanently in Palestine until 1947, whether they were expelled or remained there. Whoever is born to a Palestinian father after that date, within Palestine or outside is a Palestinian.
  • Article 6: The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.
  • Araticle 11: The Palestinians will have three mottoes: National unity mobilization and liberation.


Session 2: Further Implications of Israel being a Jewish State

The Israeli Declaration of Independence grounds the idea of the new Israeli state in, among other things, a principle of equality:

The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.[24]

Israel does not have a constitution.  Instead its foundational body of law is contained in its Basic Law.  The Basic Law assures dignity and liberty for its citizens but not, however, equality or equal treatment to all Israeli citizens.  In important ways, the declaration of Israel as the “national homeland of the Jews” creates legal preferences enjoyed by Jews over non-Jews both inside and outside Israel.  Indeed, in significant respects Jewish non-citizens of Israel (i.e. Jews in the diaspora) can claim rights within Israel that are not available to non-Jewish citizens of Israel (i.e. Palestinians Israeli citizens).  This is one of the ways in which Jewish nationality takes precedent over Israeli citizenship.

Examples of preferences given to Jewish nationals over non-Jewish citizens include:

  • Law of Return – The Law of Return of 1950, the Nationality Law of 1952, and the Entry into Israel Law of 1952 establish the right of all Jews and their family members worldwide to immigrate, or return, to Israeli and to immediately become Israeli citizens. Non-Jews are not afforded similar immigration or citizenship rights even if they had previously lived in Palestine. In fact, Israeli law and policy is designed to ensure the non-return of Palestinian refugees living in the diaspora. [25]  A close reading of these laws reveals that the 1950 Law of Return treats every Jew worldwide as having “returned,” including those in Israel/Palestine who were born in Israel and never left.  By contrast, the law treats Palestinians in the diaspora who were exiled in 1948 or later as “never present.” As some scholars summarize it: “if you’re a Jew who has never left you still have “returned” under the law and if you leave you have never left.  Palestinians, by contrast, are locked in a legal identity as “absentee” – even if they are actually “present” in Israel.”
  • Transferability of Israeli Citizenship – Israeli citizenship is not automatically transferrable if one is not a “Jewish national.” That is, Israeli citizenship is automatically passed to the spouse of a Jewish Israeli, but not for non-Jewish Israelis.  They may petition to have their spouse gain citizenship but these petitions are rarely granted.  The 2003 Nationality and Entry into Israel Law was passed by the Knesset and it prohibits the granting of any residency or citizenship status to Palestinians from the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) who are married to Israeli citizens (amended in 2007 to include citizens of “enemy states” Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon).[26]  Palestinian citizens of Israel who marry a Palestinian resident of the Gaza Strip or the West Bank are faced with two options: Either leave Israel and go to the place of one’s spouse, or leave one’s spouse in order to stay in Israel.[27]  The Law affects thousands of families comprised of tens of thousands of individuals. The Israeli press described the law as part of a larger campaign on the part of the Israeli government to “make it more difficult for non-Jews to receive Israeli citizenship or permanent resident status in Israel”, a move “aimed against granting legal status to Palestinians and other foreigners who have married Israeli citizens,” and “based on the demographic consideration of ensuring a solid Jewish majority.”[28]  The Chairman of the Israeli National Security Council explained the need for the law: “the growth in the size of the Arab minority would lead to increased demands on its part for national rights and more pressure to turn Israel into ‘a bi-national state’ or ‘a state of all its citizens.’”[29]  The Israeli Supreme Court upheld the law in 2012.[30]

Read the Israeli Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Aadel Kaadan v. Israel Lands Administration.

As you read this opinion from the Israeli Supreme Court, consider the ways in which certain claims to belonging, to ownership of land, to citizenship, and to equality are privileged while others are ignored or silenced.

Specific Questions:

  1. How does the Court treat “citizenship” differently from “nationality”?  What work does that distinction do?
  2. From where in the Israeli Basic Law does the Court find a fundamental right to equality?  (The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (s. 1), see the decision at ¶ 31.)
  3. What work do notions of Zionism and security do for the arguments made by the state or the Court in this case?
  4. What do you think of the Court’s appeal to U.S. history and legal decisions concerning racial segregation?  In what ways are they relevant to the Israeli/Palestinian circumstance?  What do you think about an appeal to the idea that racial/ethnic/religious/national origin segregation create an “affective injury” (hurt feelings)?  Is preservation of Palestinian “culture and lifestyle” what is at stake in this case?
  5. Are there other arguments that derive from the context of Israel/Palestine that might also address the injustice of denying Arab-Israeli citizens access to land in Israel?
  6. The Court frames the issue as one of a “suspect” classification based upon national origin.  What do you think of the framing of “Arab Israeli citizens” as a “national origin” or “religion” -based class?
  7. The Court distances itself from U.S. Supreme Court law by noting that: “I am prepared to assume — without ruling on the matter — that there are situations in which treatment that is separate but equal is lawful.”  What do you think of the example the Court provides to illustrate this idea?  What do you think of this principle of “positive discrimination”?
  8. What work does the idea of collective historical injury do to justify the Court’s ruling?  Does this invocation of historical injury serve to erase or ignore other historical injuries?  How might you rewrite the opinion so as to acknowledge the historical injuries to both Jews in Europe and Palestinians in Palestine (the Nakba)?
  9. The Court is clear that the principle of “Israel as a Jewish state” does not conflict with its parallel commitment to equality (“to the extent that this claim comes to say that the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish State conflict with the principle of equality, the answer is that such a conflict does not exist.”).  Do you agree?  Is this position in conflict with the idea that Israel is a democratic state?  If so, how so?   If not, how not?
  10. The Court frames the “Law of Return” as “a special key to enter,” but then notes that “once a person has lawfully entered the home, he enjoys equal rights with all other household members.”  Is this a persuasive argument in the service of the claim that there is “no contradiction between the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and between the absolute equality of all of its citizens”?
  11. The Court treats the issue as one in which the State is allocating “state land” or “its land” or “national land” via entities such as the Jewish Agency for Israel.  How might you press on this framing of the idea of “allocation” and of whose land it is to allocate?  How might a reframing shift the discrimination claim at the center of the lawsuit?

Take a look at the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1954 and 1955 decisions in Brown v. Board of Education (the school desegregation cases).  Notice that in the first Brown opinion the Supreme Court did not order a remedy, they waited to do so until a year later in the second Brown opinion.

  1. How “do facts on the ground” in the Kaadan opinion influence the remedy the Court was willing to order?  (Noting as well that “facts on the ground” influenced the remedy the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education was willing to order.)  Note the term “appropriate speed” in the Kaadan opinion and compare it to the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of the term “all deliberate speed” in Brown II.


Session 3: The Proposed “Nationality” Legislation Changing Israel’s Basic Law “to define the character of Israel as the national State of the Jewish People”

New legislation has been introduced by the right-wing MK Ze’ev Elkin (Likud) party that would amend Israel’s Basic Law in ways that would:

  • define the character of Israel as the national State of the Jewish People;
  • establish Hebrew as the only official language of the state of Israel (under current law Hebrew and Arabic are official languages of the state and English enjoys non-official status as well.  Most state signage in Israel is in Hebrew, Arabic and English);[31]
  • allow the state to “permit a community, including the members of a single religion or the members of a single nationality, to establish separate community settlements;”
  • require the State to act… “for Jewish settlement within its boundaries, and shall allot resources for these purposes.”
  • declares that “the Land of Israel,” or as it is called in Hebrew “Eretz Yesrael” (a nebulously defined area which for some includes the area of Palestine (pre-1948), and for others includes parts of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt as well) “is the historic homeland of the Jewish people and the locus of the constitution of the State of Israel.”[32]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Justice Minister Tzipi Livni proposed more tempered versions of the bill.

Read: Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, by the Interagency Task Force on Israeli Arab Issues; and An Idiot’s Guide to the Nation-State Controversy

This proposed legislation formalizes the definition of Israel as the home of the Jewish people by building this notion into the Basic Law.  Until now this idea has featured as part of Israel’s founding social and political history but not a part of its formal, legal structure.  The bill’s proponents argue that the change is needed as a response to the growing possibility that non-Jews may outnumber Jewish citizens of Israel.  Critics of the law warn that the law would elevate a commitment to Jewish nationalism over democratic principles, thus marginalizing non-Jewish citizens of Israel.

Note that the proposed legislation anchors the changes in the Israeli Declaration of Independence, yet the Declaration contains the word “Jewish” 20 times without mentioning “democracy” once.


  1. The proposals declare that the “right of National Self Determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish People.” What implications might this have for non-Jewish minorities in Israel?  Can non-Jews in Israel argue that this provision in the proposed law illegitimately denies their right to self-determination?[33]  What would that argument look like? Can the “right of return” for diasporic Jews to Israel be understood as a key aspect of Jewish self-determination?  If so, why aren’t Palestinians in the diaspora entitled to a similar right of return?  Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) sets forth that:In those States in which ethnic, religious or lingual minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.[34]Does the proposal’s language “right of National Self Determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish People” run afoul of Article 27 of the ICCPR?
  2. Two of the proposals set out that Israel is “a democratic regime” that would “be based on the principles of freedom, justice and peace in light of the vision of the Prophets of Israel, and committed to the individual rights of all its citizens as specified by any law.”  Consider the following questions about this proposed language:
    1.     How might a “democratic regime” be different from a “democratic state”?
    2.     What does it mean to anchor principles of “freedom, justice and peace” in “the vision of the Prophets of Israel”?  The “Prophets of Israel” knew nothing of the constraints on and values of modern democracies, so in what way does this conception of a “democratic regime” make sense?  Is this principle so vague as to be meaningless?
    3.     The proposal commits the state to “the individual rights of all its citizens.”  Would collective language, cultural and religious rights – particularly of minorities – be sufficiently protected by a commitment to individual rights?[35]
    4.     The “individual rights of all [Israeli] citizens” are to be “specified by any law.”  Does limiting personal rights to those “specified by any law,” risk rendering the clause effectively useless when the “law” itself is discriminatory?
  3. The proposed law assures that “each resident of Israel, without regard to his religion or nationality, shall be entitled to strive for the preservation of his culture, heritage, language and identity.”  Sounds good.  Can you foresee any concerns with this phrasing?  Does it risk privatizing what has been heretofore a public/state responsibility to recognize the multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-linguistic makeup of Israeli culture and population?  Or worse, if the proposal renders the preservation and protection of Jewish culture, heritage, language and identity as an official state project,[36] what does it mean to leave the preservation all other non-Jewish culture, heritage, language and identity as something residents are entitled to “strive for”?  Israeli courts have required the state to set up bilingual signage in mixed cities, to provide adequate funding for Muslim religious institutions and education.  Does this language risk eliminating that public responsibility
  4. Two of the proposals set out that Israel is “a democratic regime” that would “be based on the principles of freedom, justice and peace in light of the vision of the Prophets of Israel, and committed to the individual rights of all its citizens as specified by any law.”  Consider the following questions about this proposed language:
    1. How might a “democratic regime” be different from a “democratic state”?
    2. What does it mean to anchor principles of “freedom, justice and peace” in “the vision of the Prophets of Israel”?  The “Prophets of Israel” knew nothing of the constraints on and values of modern democracies, so in what way does this conception of a “democratic regime” make sense?  Is this principle so vague as to be meaningless?
    3. The proposal commits the state to “the individual rights of all its citizens.”  Would collective language, cultural and religious rights – particularly of minorities – be sufficiently protected by a commitment to individual rights?[35]
    4. The “individual rights of all [Israeli] citizens” are to be “specified by any law.”  Does limiting personal rights to those “specified by any law,” risk rendering the clause effectively useless when the “law” itself is discriminatory.
  5. The law’s core aim in declaring Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People would result in the state officially associating itself with only some members of its citizenry, including with respect to heritage, symbols, holidays, and the role that Hebrew law plays in interpreting legislation. What might be the implications of having the state officially associate itself with only some members of its citizenry?
  6. The proposals reference the Declaration of Independence yet none of them require that Israel’s Basic Law expressly recognizes equality as a right and fundamental value of the state in the same way that it is recognized in the Declaration of Independence.  Is there anything to make of this omission?
  7. Do the proposed changes contained in the “Nationality Law” risk amplifying the distinction between nationality and citizenship in Israel in ways that may further marginalize non-Jewish citizens and/or Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza?
  8. Finally, do you agree with the bills’ critics that they elevate Israel’s identity as a “Jewish state” over its identity as a “democratic state”?  Do these bills merely surface an underlying impossibility that lurks in the tension between democratic values and the entho-nationalism of political Zionism?  Do these measures merely ratify explicitly what has been an implicit fact, that Israel is and has been a “Jewish state”?
  9. Some commentators view the new law as merely reiterating and consolidating Zionist values and rules that are already well-entrenched in existing Israeli law: “Ultimately, the result of this bill would be the unification of many principles that are already law in Israel under one Basic Law. The repetition and emphasis sound shocking for those unfamiliar with Israeli law, but the bill only clarifies what is already in place and its tone reflects the current situation. Instead of looking at individual trees one by one, the observer now sees the whole forest and its very dark shadow …”[37]  If this is right, might there be an argument that it is in the interests of parties devoted to the notion that Israel is a “Jewish state” to leave well enough alone?  That is, that the “Nationality Law” risks drawing critical international attention to a state of affairs that is best maintained piecemeal rather than in one omnibus amendment to the Basic Law?


[1] So claimed David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first president.  See Ariel Feldestein, Ben-Gurion, Zionism and American Jewry: 1948 – 1963 (Routledge: New York, 2007) p. 126.

[3] Take, for instance, the U.S. Pledge of Allegiance: “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”  The Pledge reflects the notion in the U.S. context that citizenship in the U.S. and membership in the Nation are coextensive, as is membership in the “Republic.”

[4] A meeting among the victors/allies immediately following the end of World War I at which they set the terms of a new world order that included the break up of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of European controlled mandate system in the former Arab provinces, including Palestine.

[5] Ernst Frankenstein’s article explains how other political actors, such as the British politicians responsible for drafting the Balfour Declaration, may have held the view that the transition of a “Jewish home” to a “Jewish state” would reflect the fact of majority population of Jews and little more.  See Frankenstein, “The Meaning of the Term ‘National Home for the Jewish People,’” at p. 36.

[6] These twin identities conjoined to one another first appeared in the Israeli law in 1992:

1. The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. (Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992))

2. The purpose of this Basic Law if to protect freedom of occupation, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. (Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1994))

[7] “We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.”  President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 8 January, 1918.

[8] Morris R. Cohen, “Zionism: Tribalism or Liberalism?,” The New Republic, vol. 18 p. 182 (March 8, 1919).

[9] The Green Line is a term used to describe the borders established by the Armistice Agreements of 1949.

[10] For more on the fate of the Palestinians during this period see Baruch Kimmerling & Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making Of A People 127-56 (1993).

[11] See Oscar Kraines, The Impossible Dilemma: Who Is a Jew in the State of Israel? (Bloch Publishing Company, 1976).

[12] Tamarin v. State of Israel, C.A. 630/70 (1972); “Atheist Is Refused Listing As Israeli Instead of Jew,” New York Times, January 21, 1972; see discussion in John Quigley, The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective (Duke University Press: Durham, 2005) p. 129.

[13] Tamarin v. State of Israel, C.A. 630/70 (1972) and see summary in the New York Times.

[14] Uzzi Ornan et al. v. State of Israel, 8573/08, 2 October 2013. The judgment is available here; excerpts in English are available here.

[15] Id. at ¶ 19.

[16] Tamarin v. State of Israel, C.A. 630/70 (1972)(Tamarin, an Jewish citizen of Israel requested that his nationality on his Israeli registration identification card be changed from ‘Jewish’ to ‘Israeli’. The Israeli Ministry of Interior denied his request. He appealed to the Israeli courts and ultimately took his case to the Supreme Court of Israel, which supported the decision of the Ministry of the Interior.).  Israeli ID cards no longer explicitly list nationality as a field so the remedy the petitioners sought wasn’t about the identity card exactly.  Of course there are still clues that give nationality away – aside from a person’s name, Jews have birthdates listed in the Jewish calendar, and for non-Jews only the paternal grandfather’s name is given.

[17] Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset v Tibi, EC 11280/02 (2003).

[18] Unlike most industrialized countries, which have widespread private land ownership and a free real estate market, in Israel the state controls 93 % of the land (80% is owned by the state and 13% by the Jewish National Fund).  According to Israel’s Basic Law: Israel Lands (1960), lands controlled by the state, the Development Authority and the Jewish National Fund are known as “Israel Lands.”  The JNF was founded in 1901 by the World Zionist Congress as “the custodian of the land for the Jewish people.” After the founding of Israel in 1948 and land previously owned by Palestinians was seized by the state and “[t]he JNF purchased the land from the state starting in 1949 and early 1950. Then prime minister David Ben-Gurion initiated the sale of land to the JNF to prevent any possibility of international pressure forcing Israel to restore it to the Palestinian refugees.”  Amiram Barkat “Buying the State of Israel,” Haaretz, February 10, 2005.  The land is leased in 49-98 year installments from the Israel Land Authority.  See the Israel Land Authorities’ website, and the JNF’s website. For a history of the JNF, see Walter Lehn, “The Jewish National Fund,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 3, no. 4 (1974).

[19] “The mission of gathering in the exiles, which is the central task of the State of Israel and the Zionist Movement in our days, requires constant efforts by the Jewish people in the Diaspora; the State of Israel, therefore, expects the cooperation of all Jews, as individuals and groups, in building up the State and assisting the immigration to it of the masses of the people, and regards the unity of all sections of Jewry as necessary for this purpose.” World Zionist Organization – Jewish Agency (Status) Law Sec. 5 (1952).

[20] Opinion of Judge H. Meltzer, Uzzi Ornan et al. v. State of Israel, 8573/08, 2 October 2013, p. 7.

[21] For a discussion of the difference between “homeland” and “immigrant” ethnic minorities see Oren Yftachel, “The Ethnic Democracy Model and Its Applicability to the Case of Israel,” 15 Ethnic & Racial Studies, 125 (1992).  The Israeli Supreme Court has recognized this distinction and granted Palestinians special protections over other ethnic minorities in Israel.  See opinion of Chief Justice Barak in Adalah v. The Municipality of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, 56(5) P.D. at 393, para. 25.

[22] For more on this tension see Sammy Smooha, “Class, Ethnic, and National Cleavages and Democracy in Israel,” in Israeli Democracy Under Stress (Ehud Sprinzak & Larry Diamond eds., 1993) pp. 316-25.

[23] The judgment is available here; excerpts in English are available here.

[24] The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (1948)(emphasis added).  The Declaration states fundamental and important principles that framed the founding of the state of Israel, yet none of the terms of the Declaration create enforceable rights.

[25] See Ilan Sabin, “Minority Rights In Deeply Divided Societies: A Framework For Analysis And The Case Of The Arab-Palestinian Minority In Israel,” 36 New York University Journal of Int’l Law & Politics, 885 (2004) at 962, n. 300.

[26] Links to the text of the law in English including amendments in 2005 and 2007 are available here.

[27] See Sabin, “Minority Rights In Deeply Divided Societies,” at 962.

[29] Id.

[30] The opinion and analysis are available here.

[31] See Adalah v. The Municipality of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, 56(5) P.D. at 393, paras. 24-25 (Barak, C.J.), case in which Adalah, a civil rights organization that defends the rights of the Arab minority in Israel, sought an order requiring the state to post street signs in Hebrew and Arabic.  The majority of the justices found comprehensive protection for the language of the national minority in Israel as derived also from the basic values of Israel and the basic right to human dignity.

[32] “This statement is generally in line with the Zionist consensus which distinguishes between the ‘Land of Israel’ and the territory of the state of Israel: while Jews according to the Zionist vision are entitled to self-determination in the whole area of ‘the Land of Israel’, liberal Zionist are willing to make territorial compromises (more or less along the 1967 line) for the sake of political stability and in order to maintain a Jewish majority.”  Mazen Masri, “Israel’s ‘Jewish State’ Bill: Does it Really Change Anything?,” Jadaliyya, January 8, 2015.

[33] Note that current Israeli law states that:

No list of candidates will participate in elections to the Knesset and no individual will be a candidate for elections to the Knesset, if among the goals or acts of the list or among the acts of the person is included, as might be the case, explicitly or implicitly, any one of the following:

(1) Denial of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state;

(2) Incitement to racism;

(3) Support for an armed struggle, of a hostile state or a terror organization, against the State of Israel.

Section 7A of Basic Law.

And the Israeli Knesset’s internal rules stipulate that:

The chairperson of the Knesset and the deputies will not approve a bill that is, in their opinion, racist in nature or denies the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.

Section 134(c) of the Knesset Regulations 1962, Y.P. 590.

See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 26-30 (1995).

[34] See also Frances Raday, “Self-Determination and Minority Rights,” 26 Fordham International Law Journal 453 (2003).

[35] See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 26, 110-11 (1995).

[36] “The State shall act to preserve the cultural and historic heritage and tradition of the Jewish people, and to cultivate and foster them in Israel and the Diaspora.”

[37] Mazen Masri, “Israel’s ‘Jewish State’ Bill: Does it Really Change Anything?,” Jadaliyya, January 8, 2015.

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Acquisition of Israeli Nationality


Israel’s Nationality Law relates to persons born in Israel or resident therein, as well as to those wishing to settle in the country, regardless of race, religion, creed, sex or political belief. Citizenship may be acquired by:

  • Birth
  • The Law of Return
  • Residence
  • Naturalization

Acquisition of nationality by birth is granted to:

  1. Persons who were born in Israel to a mother or a father who are Israeli citizens.
  2. Persons born outside Israel, if their father or mother holds Israeli citizenship, acquired either by birth in Israel, according to the Law of Return, by residence, or by naturalization.
  3. Persons born after the death of one of their parents, if the late parent was an Israeli citizen by virtue of the conditions enumerated in 1. and 2. above at the time of death.
  4. Persons born in Israel, who have never had any nationality and subject to limitations specified in the law, if they:
    • apply for it in the period between their 18th and 25th birthday and
    • have been residents of Israel for five consecutive years, immediately preceding the day of the filing of their application.

Acquisition of Nationality according to the Law of Return

On the establishment of the State, its founders proclaimed “…the renewal of the Jewish State in the Land of Israel, which would open wide the gates of the homeland to every Jew…” In pursuance of this tenet, the State of Israel has absorbed survivors of the Holocaust, refugees from the countries in which they had resided, as well as many thousands of Jews who came to settle in Israel of their own volition.

The Law of Return (1950) grants every Jew, wherever he may be, the right to come to Israel as an oleh (a Jew immigrating to Israel) and become an Israeli citizen.

For the purposes of this Law, “Jew” means a person who was born of a Jewish mother, or has converted to Judaism and is not a member of another religion.

Israeli citizenship becomes effective on the day of arrival in the country or of receipt of an oleh’s certificate, whichever is later. A person may declare, within three months, that he/she does not wish to become a citizen.

An oleh‘s certificate may be denied to persons who:

  1. engage in activity directed against the Jewish people;
  2. may endanger public health or the security of the state;
  3. have a criminal past, likely to endanger public welfare

Since 1970, the right to immigrate under this law has been extended to include the child and the grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse of the grandchild of a Jew. The purpose of this amendment is to ensure the unity of families, where intermarriage had occurred; it does not apply to persons who had been Jews and had voluntarily changed their religion.

Acquisition of Nationality by Residence

Special provision is made in the Nationality Law for former citizens of British Mandatory Palestine. Those who remained in Israel from the establishment of the State in 1948 until the enactment of the Nationality Law of 1952, became Israeli citizens by residence or by return.

According to an amendment (1980), further possibilities to acquire citizenship by residence, were included in the law.

Acquisition of Nationality by Naturalization

Adults may acquire Israeli citizenship by naturalization at the discretion of the Minister of the Interior and subject to a number of requirements, such as:

  1. they must have resided in Israel for three years out of the five years preceding the day of submission of the application.
  2. they are entitled to reside in Israel permanently and have settled or intend to settle in Israel;
  3. they have renounced their prior nationality, or have proved that they will cease to be foreign nationals upon becoming Israeli citizens.

The Minister of the Interior may exempt an applicant from some of these requirements.

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